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Abstract—Federate learning can conduct machine learning
as well as protect the privacy of self-owned training data on
corresponding ends, instead of having to upload to a central
trusted data aggregation server. In mobile scenarios, a centralized
trusted server may not be existing, and even though it exists, the
delay will not be manageable, e.g., smart driving cars. Thus,
mobile federate learning at the edge with privacy-awareness is
attracted more and more attentions. It then imposes a problem
- after data are trained on a mobile terminal to obtain a
learned model, how to share the model parameters among others
to create more accurate and robust accumulative final model.
This kind of model sharing confronts several challenges, e.g.,
the sharing must be conducted without a third trusted party
(autonomously), and the sharing must be fair as model training
(by training data)is valuable. To tackle the above challenges,
we propose a smart contract and IPFS (Inter-Planetary File
System) based model sharing protocol and algorithms to address
the challenges. The proposed protocol does not rely on a trusted
third party, where individual-learned models are shared/stored in
corresponding ends. Conducted through extensive experiments,
three main steps of the proposed protocol are evaluated. The
average executive time of the three steps are 0.059s, 0.060s and
0.032s, demonstrating its efficiency.
Index Terms—Smart contract, Mobile federated learning, Ar-
tificial intelligence model, Fairness, Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data fusion and learning from various data sources provides
more information dimensions than single data sources. For ex-
ample, a bank records user property, revenue and expenditure
records, and an e-commerce platform has participant browsing
records, purchase records and collection records. If these two
types of data can be integrated, a product recommendation
system based on artificial intelligence (AI) can be realized.
Accessing to various data sources, however, faces the follow-
ing challenges: barriers between data sources are hard to break,
and data islands exist; participants may not know the future use
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of models, thus less motivated to contribute data, and model
transactions violate laws and regulations [1].
Federal transfer learning effectively overcomes these chal-
lenges to a certain extent. In federated learning, a mobile
terminal trains self-owned data to its individual-learned model
and sent to a central trusted server. Then the server collects and
summarize individual-learned models from mobile terminals
to create more accurate and robust accumulative final model.
During the whole training process, data are trained on each
mobile terminal, which does not need to be uploaded to
a centralized server, but how to securely and fairly share
the model parameters to others who as well desire these
parameters needs to be addressed. In general, sharing models
saves time and cost of training models, and makes models
widely used. For example, as a buyer, using others’ models
can save the time of training new models. On the other hand,
as a seller, it is more efficient to transfer parameters instead of
the whole model. Existing work [26], [27], [28], [29] based
on blockchain do not meet the requirements: (a) no trusted
third parties, (b) fairness, and (c) publicly verifiable at the
same time.
• (a) In mobile scenarios, a centralized trusted server may
not be existing, and even though it exists, the delay will
not be manageable. Thus, the sharing must be conducted
without a third trusted party (autonomously).
• (b) The sharing must be fair as model training (by training
data)is valuable. Thus, a verification mechanism after
receiving it also needs to be proposed.
• (c) Another challenge is that all data on the smart contract
is publicly accessible to all, which complicates the design
of privacy protection methods.
In this paper, we propose a model sharing protocol and
algorithms without the need of a trusted third party. The
proposed protocol is based on smart contract and IPFS (Inter-
Planetary File System). We request the contracting parties to
upload the model files to IPFS, and use the combination of
symmetric key and public key encryption system in the process
of address transfer, so as to meet the traceability and non-
tamperability. In other words, our scheme can protect the pri-
vacy of the buyer and the seller. Besides, fairness is provided:
the buyer obtains the model through purchasing/exchanging,
and the seller obtains the token/model at the same time.
Any participant can report each other’s cheating behavior.
Moreover, publicly verifiable is provided via identify cheating
participants due to the verification mechanism through low-
quality (accuracy rate <50%) parameters. In addition to privacy
2protection and fairness, the scheme also realizes autonomy.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a model sharing scheme based on a smart
contract, in which the buyer and the seller can complete
the transaction independently without a third trusted party
(autonomously).
• The method can meet the requirement with fairness as
model training (by training data)is valuable. We propose
to classify the model according to the accuracy rate of
parameters, that is, high-quality (accuracy rate >90%)
parameters are used for buying and selling, low-quality
(accuracy rate <50%) parameters are used for verification,
so as to ensure the fairness of the transaction and avoid
any fraud between the buyer and the seller.
• The method can meet the requirement with traceability
and non-tamperability, we request the contracting parties
upload the model files to IPFS(Inter-Planetary File Sys-
tem), so as to obtain the file address, which can reduce
the storage pressure of the smart contract.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives
an overview of the relevant previous work. In Section III, we
propose our system model and the corresponding adversary
model. Section IV illustrates the proposal and implementation
of our scheme . In Section V, we evaluate the security and
performance of our scheme. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Smart Contract
Blockchain is becoming more and more popular and has
many applications in a wide range of industries [2], [3]. A
popular instance of blockchain is smart contract, which is
also used for different settings [4], [5], [6]. Smart contract
can support automatic programming execution in a distributed
way. It is a kind of computer protocol that spreads, verifies or
executes the contract in an autonomous way. Besides, trusted
transactions can be executed without a third party through
smart contract, which can also meet the requirement with
traceability and non-tamperability. In addition, smart contract
can run on the virtual machine of Ethereum. Each node of
Ethereum provides computing power, and they also pay with
the digital currency of Ether as the resource. All participants of
the blockchain can see smart contract and operate transactions
according to these unified protocol.
Recently, more and more people are paying attention to the
research of blockchain, from designing new cipher primitives
to supporting different functions, to identifying vulnerabilities
in smart contracts, and so on. At the same time, due to the
growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI), there are also
some attempts to use AI technology for vulnerability detection
in smart contracts. For example, Jiang[7], Mavridou[8], Wu[9]
put forward some relevant methods. Besides, smart contract
is written in a stable format and then can be sent to the
blockchain in the byte code format of the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM). Grishchenko [10] proposed the first com-
plete small step semantics of EVM bytecode and formalized
the proof assistant. This allows them to obtain executable
code which can then be used to validate against the official
Ethereum test suite. Tikhomirov[11] provided code problems
and implements an extensible static analysis tool, SmartCheck,
which can convert reliable source code into XML based
intermediate representation and check the representation ac-
cording to the XPath pattern. In addition, Zhou[12] proposed
a security assurance method for smart contract source code
to detect potential security risks, which mainly includes two
functions. One is to analyze the syntax and topology of the
call relationship of the smart contract, the other is to detect
and locate the logical risks that may lead to vulnerabilities,
and mark the results on the topology.
B. Federated Learning in Industrial IoT
With the rapid development of intelligent mobile terminals,
various industrial Internet of Things applications can make
full use of them to collect and share data to provide specific
services [13]. However, the main challenge in Industrial IoT is
that there are barriers between data sources are hard to break,
and data islands exist. In addition, the security of the Internet
of Things ecosystem is worth studying, such as malicious at-
tackers, adversarial attacks and sinkhole attacks [14]. In recent
years, many scholars put forward some related methods to
tackle the above challenge. The concept of federated learning
was put forward by Google [15], [16], [17], and their purpose
is building a machine learning model on the premise of not
disclosing data, that is, participants can protect the privacy
of self-owned training data on corresponding ends, instead of
having to upload to a central trusted data aggregation server.
Zhu [18] applied federated learning with a deep convolutional
network to perform variable-length text string recognition with
a large corpus. They compared two frameworks (Tensorflow
Federated and PySyft) to show the federal text recognition
model can achieve similar or even higher accuracy than
the model trained on the deep learning frameworks. Song
[19] proposed cloud-based architecture inspired by federated
learning, which enables the sharing of defense capabilities
against different attacks among IIoT devices. In addition, in
order to prevent private data leakage, Zhang [20] proposed two
privacy-preserving asynchronous deep learning schemes and
Hao [21] proposed an efficient and privacy-enhanced federated
learning scheme.
C. The Application of Blockchain in Federated Learning
Federate learning can conduct machine learning as well
as protect the privacy of self-owned training data on corre-
sponding ends, instead of uploading to a central trusted data
aggregation server. However, there are also some challenges
need to be tackled, such as how to reduce the load and
how to ensure the data security and the accuracy of the
model. In recent years, many scholars have mentioned the
combination of blockchain and federated learning. Kim [26]
proposed blockchain based federated learning scenario in order
to minimize the network load, that is, blockchian can not only
promise the integrity and stability, but induce participants to
participate in learning and separate them into some separate
nodes. Majeed [27] proposed a federated learning security
3architecture (FLchain) based on blockchain network which
stores the local model parameters for each global iteration
as blocks on a channel-specific ledger. Besides, an EOS
Blockchain design and workflow was proposed by Martinez
[28] in order to establish data security. They also implement
a small example of their blockchain federated learning model
to analyze its performance. Kim [29] proposed a blockchained
federated learning (BlockFL) architecture, which can exchange
and verify the update of local learning model. By taking
advantage of the consensus mechanism in the blockchain,
learning models on corresponding ends does not require any
centralized training data or coordination. Besides, Lu [30]
integrated federated learning into the consensus process of
licensed blockchain, so that the calculation of consensus can
be used for federated training.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Framework
In our scheme, we assume that there are two participants:
the seller (such as Alice) and the buyer (such as Bob). To
reduce the workload of model sharing, we divide the scheme
transaction into two parts: exchange model and transaction
model. If the model is equivalent, they can exchange their
models, otherwise transaction their models.
We classify models according to their parameters, low-
quality (accuracy <50%) parameters are used to prove, and
high-quality (accuracy >90%) parameters are used to transac-
tion. In the process of verifying models, we use a manual
verification mechanism of blockchain nodes and a random
selection verification mechanism. Buyers can confirm the ac-
curacy of the model, and sellers can ensure that the verification
data provided by buyers is reliable. In order to avoid buyers
deliberately providing invalid verification data sets, buyers
have to provide the verification data before transactions start,
and store them in plaintext on blockchain, so that both parties
can confirm the validity of the data. In addition, the whole
Fig. 1. System Framework - Trading models
transaction process is completely controlled by smart contract.
Alice and Bob respectively package and publish the purpose
of their models to blockchain sales chain and pay deposits to
smart contract. After Bob pays the token to the smart contract,
Alice packages the model’s purpose, structure, parameters with
accuracy higher than 90%, input and output format, and 20%
test set data (which can be adjusted appropriately according to
the buyer’s quotation, that is, the higher the quotation, the more
training set data can be given) into a model file and uploads to
IPFS to obtain corresponding address. Next, Alice sends this
address to Bob. After receiving this model file, Bob checks
whether the accuracy of the model meets the requirements
through the received training set. If it meets the requirements,
Bob triggers the confirmation receipt mechanism within the
stipulated time, and Alice receives the token; otherwise, Bob
triggers the verification mechanism.
After completing transaction, Alice gets the token and Bob
gets the required model. During the whole transaction, any
suspected cheating will be punished. The model transaction
process is shown in Fig. 1, and the model exchange process
is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. System Framework - Exchanging Models
B. Adversary Model
There are some potential threats in transactions. We classify
these threats into following categories:
Threats from a dishonest seller. The seller provides invalid
or low accuracy model parameters, which will result in the
inability to meet the requirements of the buyer and the fairness
of the transaction. In our scheme, we adopt a verification
and voting mechanism through the manual verification of
blockchain nodes. If the number of confirming the correctness
of the model is more than 60% of all nodes, the buyer’s
deposit will be awarded to the seller and the participated
nodes; otherwise, the seller’s deposit will be awarded to the
buyer and the participated nodes.
The seller intentionally provides false model verification pa-
rameters, which will cause the buyer’s verification mechanism
to be invalid and cannot satisfy the fairness of the transaction.
In order to avoid such behavior, in the verification process,
buyers can randomly select 2 or 3 parameters and provide parts
of data sets for verification, so as to confirm the accuracy of
the model.
The seller provides a non-existent address. Obviously, when
buyers discover that the address does not exist, they can claim
within the time specified by the system.
The model sold by the seller is not consistent with the adver-
tising model. For example, the seller replaces the advertising
model with another model. Due to the use of the IPFS file
system, any changes in the data will cause a corresponding
address change. Thus, this is evidence which can be used later.
Threats from a dishonest buyer. The buyer intentionally
provides an invalid verification data set, which will result in
the seller’s failure to receive payment and unable to meet the
fairness of the transaction. In order to avoid such behavior, the
4buyer has to provide data and store in plaintext on blockchain
before transactions starts, and the validity of the data is
confirmed by both buyer and seller, so as to avoid the buyer’s
regret during the verification. Since the submitted data is small
part of real data or structured data, as a buyer, he can accept
data exposure under the circumstances.
After the buyer receives the model, he refuses to trigger the
confirmation receiving mechanism within a certain period of
time, which will lead to the seller’s failure to receive payment
and cannot meet the fairness of the transaction. Such behavior
will confiscate the buyer’s deposit and blacklist the buyer (i.e.,
record such dishonest behavior on the blockchain).
After receiving the purchased model which the value is
higher than deposit, the buyer terminates the transaction ab-
normally. In our scheme, the margin amount is required to
be equal to or higher than the transaction amount, so the
cheating motivation of terminating the transaction abnormally
is eliminated.
The buyer initiates the transaction multiple times by com-
pleting any of these transactions, which will take up resources
and lead to denial of service. There are many ways to avoid
this behavior, for example, we can record the number of
transactions initiated by the buyer and limit the number of
daily transactions per participant. In other words, if the number
of duplicate transactions exceeds the limit and none of these
transactions are completed, the system will block further
transaction service requests from the same participant for a
predetermined period of time (for example, 24 hours).
Attacks from others. A man-in-the-middle attack is one
in which normal network traffic is intercepted or data is
tampered with or sniffed without either party knowing it. In
our scheme, the attacker can act as a middleman, forming
two pairs of keys between buyers and sellers, decrypting,
encrypting, and forwarding the model files. In order to avoid
these attacks, we use the combination of symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography to encrypt the model files, so as
to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted
contents.
Attackers impersonate sellers or buyers to steal data. We use
address based authentication and use smart contract to mitigate
these attacks.
The contract is under attack. Attackers can steal tokens in
smart contracts or disrupt the normal transaction order, causing
economic losses to both buyers and sellers. In this paper, we
assume that the smart contract is secure.
C. Design Goals
In this section, we will explain the design goals of our
scheme:
1) Fairness: after the transaction is terminated normally,
Bob gets the model he needs, and Alice receives the
sales revenue. Any alleged misconduct will be investi-
gated and punished (for example, confiscating deposit
or blacklisting).
2) Autonomy: the transaction and verification process are
controlled by smart contract. Smart contract has the
characteristics of high timeliness and decentralization
of contract formulation and it does not rely on the
participation of the third-party authority or central or-
ganization, which greatly reduces the intermediate link
of protocol formulation and improves the efficiency of
protocol formulation. In addition, smart contract has
high accuracy and does not need human participation,
which eliminates mistakes and improves the accuracy
of the contract.
3) Confidentiality and non-tamperability: in the process of
transmitting address, we use the combination of sym-
metric and asymmetric cryptography to prevent man-
in-the-middle attacks and ensure the confidentiality of
transactions. The seller has to upload the model file
to IPFS to obtain the corresponding address. Due to
the characteristics of IPFS, any change will cause the
address to change, which ensures the model file can not
be tampered.
4) Time control: the transaction must be completed within
the specified time. Failure to complete the specified steps
within the specified time will be punished (e.g., deduct
the deposit).
IV. PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHEME
Next, we will detail the components of our proposed solu-
tion in six modules. Table I lists the specific meanings of the
symbols used.
TABLE I
NOTATION
DM Model’s data
TM Partial training set of the model
KB Bob’s symmetric key
PKA Alice’s public key
SKA Alice’s private key
ADA Address of Alice’s model file in IPFS
ADB Address of Bob’s model file in IPFS
Q A random number generated by random number generator
Mprice The price of the model
MA Address of model file
A. The Process of Exchanging Models
In this section, we will elaborate the process of exchanging
models, and the specific process is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. The Process of Exchanging Models
1) Alice and Bob respectively package and publish the
purpose of their models to the blockchain sales chain
and pay corresponding deposit to smart contract;
2) Bob asks Alice the price of the model which he desires.
Alice views the models that Bob owns. If Bob has the
5model that Alice interests, go to step 3; otherwise, go
to step 4;
3) Alice packages the model’s price and sends to Bob, and
then asks for the price of the model that Alice interests;
4) Bob packages the model’s price and sends to Alice;
5) If the prices of Alice and Bob’s models are equiv-
alent, they can exchange models directly. Alice and
Bob respectively package the model’s purpose, structure,
parameters with accuracy higher than 90%, input and
output format, 20% TM (which can be adjusted appro-
priately according to the buyer’s quotation) intoDM and
upload to IPFS to obtain the corresponding address;
6) Alice and Bob obtain the address through the specific
address transfer process and obtain the corresponding
model file from IPFS;
7) Inspection by both parties: check whether the accuracy
of the model meets the requirements through the re-
ceived training set. If it meets the requirements, trig-
gering the confirmation receiving mechanism within
the stipulated time. Otherwise, triggering verification
mechanism.
B. The Process of Trading Models
In this section, we will elaborate the process of trading
models and the specific algorithm of smart contract processing
is shown in Algorithm 1.
1) The first four steps of trading models are the same as
1-4 in IV-A;
2) If the prices of Alice and Bob’s models are inequivalent,
they have to trade models. Bob gives tokens to smart
contract. Next, Alice packages the purpose of the model,
(the way to use the model), structure, parameters with
accuracy higher than 90%, input and output formats,
20% of the TM (according to the buyer offer appropriate
adjustments) into a model file and upload to IPFS to
obtain the corresponding address;
3) Bob obtains the address through the specific address
transfer process and downloads the corresponding model
file from IPFS;
4) Buyer’s inspection: Bob checks whether the accuracy
of the model meets the requirements according to the
received training set. If it meets the requirements, after
triggering the confirmation receiving mechanism within
the stipulated time, Alice receives Bob’s token; other-
wise, Bob triggers verification mechanism.
C. The Process of Transferring Address
In this section, we will elaborate the process of transferring
address and the specific process is shown in Fig. 4.
1) Bob uses random number generator to generate random
number Q and hash it to get H(Q);
2) Bob encrypts KB and H(Q) with Al-
ice’s public key PKA, and then sends
{IDB||EPKA(KB||H(Q))||T ime} to Alice through
PKA’s encryption;
3) Alice uses SKA decryption to get
{IDB||EPKA(KB||H(Q))||T ime}. After confirming
Algorithm 1: Smart Contract for Transaction
Input: deposit of Alice DepositA, deposit of Bob
DepositB, PKA, PKB , Token, TimeLimit
Output: result of the transaction ResultTrans, time
when the transaction starts TimeStart
Alice sets the amount of DepositA, DepositB and Mprice;
Alice sends the function of the model to the selling chain;
Alice sends DepositA to the smart contract, TimeStart =
now;
if The amount of DepositA is right then
Alice uploads PKB and TimeLimit to the smart
contract, and the smart contract records the time
now as TimeStart;
if now ≤ T imeStart+ T imeLimit then
Bob sends DepositB to the smart contract and ask
the Mprice;
Alice sends Mprice to Bob;
if The amount of DepositB is right then
Alice sends DM to IPFS;
Alice gets ADA from IPFS;
Alice sends encrypted ADA to the smart
contract;
if Bob receives ADA then
Bob sends Token to the smart contract;
if DM is right then
Bob triggers confirm receipt
mechanism;
Result Trans = true;
Bob triggers verification mechanism;
Result Trans = false;
else
The smart contract waits for Bob to
receive DA;
else
The smart contract refuses DepositB;
else
Alice or Bob ends the transaction;
else
The smart contract refuses DepositA;
Bob’s ID, Alice decrypts EPKA(KB) through SKA to
get Bob’s symmetric keys KB and H(Q);
4) Alice uses KB to encrypt the model file address ADA,
and sends {IDA||
EPKB(ADA||H(Q))||T ime} to Bob through PKB’s
encryption;
5) B obtains ADA through SKB’s decryption.
D. Verification Mechanism
If the model’s accuracy does not meet the requirements, the
buyer triggers the verification and voting mechanism through
some participated nodes on blockchain, the specific steps are
as follows:
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• The seller provides multiple model parameters with ac-
curacy less than 50% to the participated nodes;
• The buyer randomly selects two or three parameters and
provides part of the data set for verification;
• We adopt voting mechanism, that is, if the number of
confirming the correctness of the model is more than 60%
of all nodes, the buyer’s deposit will be awarded to the
seller and the participated nodes; otherwise, the seller’s
deposit will be awarded to the buyer and the participated
nodes.
In this process, we adopted the model parameters with
accuracy less than 50%, because if the accuracy is too high,
the model will be exposed directly and buyer does not have to
buy it. Besides, the purpose of the buyer’s random selection is
to ensure the validity of the data provided by the verification
provider, so that the buyer can confirm the accuracy of the
model and the seller can ensure that the verification data
provided by the buyer is reliable. In addition, in most cases,
the inspection is done by the buyer. Only when the verification
mechanism is triggered can the models be inspected through
the node verification mechanism. In this way, the workload
can be reduced to a certain extent.
In addition, in order to encourage participation in the
transaction, we adopt the incentive mechanism: the part of
the transaction is used to reward both buyers and sellers
in equal proportion. Besides, in order to encourage nodes
participating in the verification mechanism, we also give them
the corresponding bonus. In order to ensure the fairness of
the transaction, both buyers and sellers should pay deposits to
smart contract before transactions start. During the process of
the transaction, if they violate rules, the corresponding deposit
will be confiscated.
E. Time Control
In order to improve fairness, we set several time limits.
Within each limit, Alice and Bob need to complete corre-
sponding work. The specific definitions are as follows:
• T0: Alice and Bob need to pay DepositA and DepositB
respectively to smart contract within T0. Otherwise, if the
transaction is terminated, the deposit previously paid will
be refunded.
• T1: In the process of exchanging model, Alice and Bob
need to upload the model file to IPFS in T1 time, oth-
erwise the transaction will be terminated. In the process
of model transaction, Alice needs to upload model files
to IPFS in T1. At the same time, Bob needs to submit
token to smart contract, otherwise the transaction will be
terminated.
• T2: In the process of exchanging model, Bob should
transmit the encrypted symmetric key KB to Alice in
T2 time, and Alice should transmit the encrypted sym-
metric key KA to Bob, otherwise the transaction will be
terminated. In the process of model transaction, within
T2, Bob should pass the encrypted symmetric key KB to
Alice, otherwise the transaction will be terminated.
• T3: In the process of exchanging model, Alice and Bob
should transmit the addresses of their model files to each
other through key encryption within T3 time, otherwise
the transaction will be terminated. In the process of model
transaction, within T3, Alice should pass the encrypted
ADA to Bob, otherwise the transaction will be termi-
nated.
• Tb: We set a buffer time Tb to ensure Bob has enough time
to complete the inspection. At the same time, Alice can
not extract the token until Bob triggers the confirmation
receipt mechanism or exceeding Tb . After Tb time,
DepositA and DepositB will be sent back to Alice and
Bob through smart contract.
F. Discussion
We also consider how to speed up the verification while
ensuring the accuracy of the verification, so we propose
reducing the number of verification nodes. Our scheme adopts
incentive mechanism, which uses part of the deposit as bonus
to reward the participated nodes in the verification. To reduce
bonus, reducing the number of verification nodes has become
an advanced scheme. However, how to ensure the fairness and
accuracy while reducing the number of nodes? If the verifica-
tion nodes can be randomly selected online, this goal can be
achieved, and some malicious attacks can also be avoided. In
the future work, we consider improving our scheme from the
following aspects: reducing communication, calculation, time
delay and improving security (including fault tolerance, anti
node compromise rate).
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Fairness Analysis
If both Alice and Bob are honest, the transaction will be
completed successfully, which can be regarded as the best case.
7However, some unexpected situations are also occurred. Thus,
we need to use the record on smart contract as evidence to
identify the abnormal steps or punish the offending partici-
pants. In addition, we adopt deposit mechanism, that is, the
deposit of the offending party will be confiscated and paid to
the other party.
The amount of deposit we set is higher than the model bid
price, which will prevent Alice or Bob abnormally terminating
the transaction after they obtain models.
Before transactions start, it is necessary to judge whether
the models’ prices are equivalent or not. If equivalent, they
can exchange models directly; otherwise, they have to trade
models. In this way, the fairness of transaction can be meet
and some unequal exchanges can be avoided.
Within the time period when the model is received but
the confirm receipt mechanism is not triggered, both Alice
and Bob can raise objections about the transaction process.
Therefore, if Bob claims he does not get the address of
the model file provided by Alice, he can trigger verification
mechanism. The The participated nodes judge which one is
lying and deducts the corresponding deposit.
In the verification mechanism, we give the buyer two or
three chances to randomly select model parameters to ensure
the validity of the data provided by the verification provider,
so that the buyer can confirm the accuracy of the model and
the seller can ensure that the verification data provided by the
buyer is reliable, which meets the fairness of the transaction.
B. Security Analysis
In this section, we will evaluate our solution from a security
perspective.
Traceability and Non-tamperability: our scheme adopts
IPFS and smart contract, the process of sharing model can
avoid the existence of semi-honest third party and meet
traceability and non-tamperability.
Confidentiality and Integrity: the confidentiality means
data will not be disclosed to unauthorized participants. The
integrity means data cannot be tampered with (for example,
inserted, modified, deleted, and reordered) without authoriza-
tion. Due to the non-tamperability of IPFS and the traceability
of smart contract, our scheme can prevent unauthorized access
and tampering, which meets confidentiality and integrity.
Prevent Man-in-the-middle attacks: the general process
of delivering address is easy to be attacked by others. We
assume that the attacker is C, the seller is A, and the buyer is
B. The third party C acts as receiver B when communicating
with A, or acts as B when communicating with the receiver A.
In this case, both A and B negotiate a key with C, which can
monitor and transmit transactions. MITM attacks are described
as follows: B encrypts KB and H (Q) with A’s public key
PKA, and sends {IDB||EPKA(KB||H(Q))||T ime} to A
through PKA encryption; C attempts to intercept and parse
the message. C cannot get KB because he does not have
a private key SKA. So our scheme can effectively prevent
MITM attacks.
Fig. 5. The Time Consuming of Exchanging Models
C. Performance Analysis
We evaluate the scheme in terms of the consumed time
of the major three steps in protocols. In the experimental
transmission process, we use RSA and DES to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of the message. The specific
system environment configuration is shown in Table II, and
the specific time consumption is shown in the Fig. 5. Three
lines in the figure represent three steps of exchanging models
in Fig. 3. The average time of the three steps is respectively
0.059s, 0.060s and 0.032s, which shows that our scheme is
feasible.
TABLE II
SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT CONFIGURATION
The project name Hardware version number or condition
Operating system Windows 10
Development environment python3.8
Programming language Python
D. Industrial applications
As shown in Fig. 6, the data (including images, videos,
etc.) of each node in the industrial Internet of Things needs
to be distributed in-stu machine learning to obtain and share
relevant smart information. For example, a video camera node
on a factory’s production line learns and obtains product pass
rate information and shares it with another factory’s node to
control the raw material supply of the product.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a scheme consisting of sharing
protocol and dedicated algorithms. We implement our scheme
by smart contract and IPFS (Inter-Planetary File System). The
scheme we proposed ensures that the private data will not be
disclosed in model sharing to implement privacy protection. In
addition, we use smart contracts to avoid third party entities.
In our scheme, we also introduce validation control and time
control to improve the fairness and automation of sharing
models. In addition, we evaluate the scheme in terms of the
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consumed time of the major three steps in protocols. The
average time of three steps is respectively 0.059s, 0.060s and
0.032s, which justified that our scheme is feasible. In the future
work, we consider improving our scheme from the following
aspects: reducing communication, calculation and time delay,
and improving the security (including fault tolerance, anti node
compromise rate).
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